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ABSTRACT
In this vision paper, we focus on a key aspect of the modern soft-
ware developer’s potential to write secure software: their (lack of)
success in securely using cryptography APIs. In particular, we note
that most ongoing research tends to focus on identifying concrete
problems software developers experience, and providing workable
solutions, but that such solutions still require developers to iden-
tify the appropriate API calls to make and, worse, to be familiar
with and configure sometimes obscure parameters of such calls. In
contrast, we envision identifying and employing targeted visual
metaphors to allow developers to simply select the most appropriate
cryptographic functionality they need.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Developing software is no longer the domain of the select few
with deep technical skills, training and knowledge. Mobile and web
app development and easy-to-program hardware devices, such as
Arduino and Raspberry Pi, have resulted in a wide range of people
from diverse backgrounds developing software. This diversity of
developers is at the heart of a range of innovations that drive our
digital economy. The software they produce can be, and is, deployed
across systems pervasive in many aspects of human activity and is
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used by a global user base. But such software development by all
holds several security implications.
Research has shown that use of cryptography APIs are a common
cause of software vulnerability [4, 5], particularly in the mobile
domain. Consider, for example, a basic client-server application
where the client delegates to the server some computational task
and where it is desired that the communication relating to this
computation stays secret (from third parties). An inexperienced
designer would conclude that it suffices to simply encrypt the client-
server communication. There are however several other crucial yet
non-obvious questions that need to be answered before conclud-
ing that encryption is sufficient. For example, the client needs to
guarantee the identity of the server before it makes any query,
encryptions should be authenticated [1], replay of messages that
were sent encrypted should not be possible, et cetera.
Employing protocols (rather than vanilla encryption) goes a long
way towards avoiding many subtle pitfalls. For example, when used
with care, a secure channel protocol like the Transport Layer Secu-
rity (TLS) takes care of entity and message authentication, integrity
of the communication and so on. Furthermore, good, widely vetted
protocol implementations are readily available through libraries.
However, a developer using these libraries is faced with further
challenges. The APIs of these libraries are complex and unintuitive,
require users to set often obscure parameters, and select between
many possible configurations – some secure, some insecure! Many
attacks are in fact due to incompetent uses of existing libraries [5].
Shuai et al. investigated the misuse of cryptography APIs in An-
droid applications, finding significant misuse, varying from the use
of ECB-mode for encryption, use of broken algorithms such as DES,
and having reversible one-way hashes [13]. Chatzikonstantinou et
al. similarly analyzed 49 Android applications and found 87.8% to
contain some degree of cryptographic misuse [2]. They proposed
strategies for mitigating this misuse, by formulating guidelines and
best practices for developers. However, such guidelines still place
the stress of getting the code right on the individual developer,
lacking e.g., tool support that generates the code for them, or at
least nudges them towards correct use of the cryptography API.
To understand why developers have such trouble using cryptog-
raphy APIs correctly, Nadi et al. [10] performed several empirical
studies, focused on eliciting the difficulties developers face. They
found that the key challenges in using a cryptography API correctly
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were identification of the correct sequence of method calls, under-
standing of the underlying API, and identification of the parameters
to use. However, as these studies were based on self-reported data,
to what extent developers actually understood the concepts cor-
rectly remains unknown.
Given the difficulty that developers have using cryptography
APIs, while claiming to understand it, we believe this calls for
support strategies that do not place the stress of correctly using
such APIs on the developer. In order to ensure that such tools and
guidance are as effective as possible in encouraging correct cryp-
tographic API use, it is crucial that an in-depth understanding of
how users understand this activity is developed. This must include
both their understanding of the interface and how it operates, and
their wider (potentially, lack of) understanding of the fundamental
cryptography concepts on which it is based. Only once this basic
research is conducted will it be possible to ensure that decision
support tools are appropriately matched to the difficulties experi-
enced by those using them. Rather than simply assisting the user in
completing a task, this will allow for the development of adaptive
mechanisms that aid future learning and understanding within user
populations. To summarize the problem,
(1) cryptography functionality is vital for most modern
software, but the use of cryptography APIs is challeng-
ing and has led to many security vulnerabilities
(2) current supporting strategies for developers are based
on guidelines that tell developers what (not) to dowhile
writing code, instead of taking the problem out of their
hands
In the rest of this vision paper we set out a first step towards the
longer-term goal of matching support to the user. In particular, we
outline how the combination of using empirically grounded visual
metaphors appropriate to specific communities of developers could
side-step the need for them to understand cryptography in detail,
and more importantly: allow a trade-off between flexibility of use
and not allowing them to get things wrong. Section 2 details the
developers we focus on: the young and inexperienced developers
ruling the day in mobile software development. Section 3 discusses
the kind of assistance available to them, followed by Section 4
which sets out a research agenda for eliciting metaphors for key
cryptography functionality, and how this may aid in the design of
tools supporting the use of cryptography APIs. Finally, we conclude
in Section 5.
2 THE COMMUNITY: EVER YOUNGER AND
LESS EXPERIENCED
A 2012 study of mobile software developers found that 40% worked
as independents, 27% in 2–3 person organizations, and only 19% in
organizations with > 10 people [3]. Recent professional reports [14]
show that mobile developers have less experience, and are not as
motivated by financial gains as others. For example, the solo ‘hob-
byists’ (15%) who just want to have fun, and ‘explorers’ (28%) out
learning and testing the market, constitute almost half of the de-
veloper demographic in 2016. Even outside of the inexperienced,
other demographics constitute a rather significant further share
of the population, such as ‘hunters’ (21%): independent developers
focused on the money, and ‘guns for hire’ (15%): independent de-
velopers working on commission. With 52% of mobile developers
having a revenue below $500 per month, financial success is not
guaranteed.
Software development in the mobile domain thus seems to have
become the playground of the young, independent, and inexperi-
enced —and this is unlikely to change soon. Furthermore, of the
(independent) developers working with established organizations,
1
3 introduce personally acquired tools to those organizations. Young
and/or independent developers thus seem to increasingly rule the
day in mobile software development, meaning that focusing on
security behaviors of individual developers has the potential to not
only impact their own practices but also that of the organizations
that may employ them.
Given the prevalence of young, inexperienced developers, and
the need to stimulate them to produce secure software, understand-
ing the way they think and conceptualize cryptography is of vital
importance. API developers may be the typical ‘gurus’, older, more
experienced and likely well-educated in relation to their technical
background, which can lead to a significant conceptual misalign-
ment between them and the developers.
3 THE SUPPORT: FROM TELLING TO
SHOWING
As briefly mentioned before, developers have some support avail-
able to them to guide them towards correct use of cryptography
APIs. However, much of this support takes the form ofwell-intended
guidelines and best practices that do little to alleviate the key prob-
lem: the community of young and inexperienced developers simply
does not ‘get’ the minutiae of using cryptography APIs to the
same extent as the API developers (and well-meaning researchers)
do [2, 10, 13].
For example, a recently proposed tool, CogniCrypt [9], makes a
move in the right direction by providing code generation that se-
curely uses certain cryptography functions and live static analyses
of code as it is being written. However, the way the latter is imple-
mented to support developers is based on normative statements
that tell users that what they did was wrong, and what they should
do instead, without necessarily explaining why or ensuring they
will get it right. For example, a warning provided by CogniCrypt is:
“The insecure algorithm DES is used. Please use se-
cure algorithm (e.g. AES) instead.”
Although providing such a warning may alert users to the fact that
they have made an error, it does not explain why their choice is
incorrect in this instance. As a result, the developer’s understanding
remains constrained, while still having to ensure that they use the
API correctly. Instead, future iterations could take the responsibility
of even writing the code that calls the API out of the hands of
developers.
Over the past decade, a rather appropriate paradigm has become
more popular, especially to teach younger developers: visual pro-
gramming languages. Projects such as Scratch [12] and code.org [8]
have shown the feasibility of creating programming environments
designed around the interfaces that the modern developer commu-
nity is used to. Touch Develop [15], for example, was designed with
the idea of using only touchscreen input rather than the traditional
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keyboard. A visual programming environment specifically designed
for the creation of Android applications, App Inventor [17], has
had significant uptake, and has been used to, e.g., introduce com-
puting science concepts [6], and study how developers’ general and
domain-specific skill progresses as they develop more apps [18].
It is in this shift from telling to showing where we envision the
safe use of cryptography APIs to be. In a drag and drop environment,
developers could simply pick the functionality they want, and be
assured of a correct and secure use. Instead of trying to understand
documentation written by the API developer, they simply determine
they want to send a message securely from sender to recipient,
and drag the relevant blocks in place. With code generation as
demonstrated by CogniCrypt [9] this would be feasible, but require
us to make sure users understand exactly what they are dragging
into their program. To ensure that, we need to understand how
these developers think, and elicit appropriate visual metaphors that
will allow for clear matching between what the developers wants
to achieve, and what the cryptography functionality offers.
4 THE RESEARCH AGENDA: TOWARDS
EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED APPROPRIATE
CRYPTOGRAPHY METAPHORS
To provide visual building blocks that clearly indicate their under-
lying functionality, we need to understand how developers think.
Language, whether visual or textual, and its underlying concepts
is the language of community, and should be understood in the
context of that community’s habits and way of thought. [11]. Thus,
to determine what metaphors are appropriate to use for a given
concept, we have to engage with the community described in Sec. 2.
While visual metaphors are an essential part of conveying com-
plicated concepts to lay users, even the common visual metaphors
in cryptography are not necessarily as appropriate as they could be.
Even in their seminal paper Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt, Whitten
and Tygar [16] noted issues with core visual metaphors, such as
requiring more granularity in the notion of keys, and not using out-
dated symbolism such as quill pens for signatures. Given that our
community is ever younger, using such outdated visual metaphors
would be a problem indeed.
Instead of focusing on visual metaphors for individual concepts
(e.g., quill for the concept of signature), as a first step we propose
to elicit community-specific visual metaphors for essential cryp-
tography functionality. From Nadi et al. we infer that essential
cryptography functionality needed by developers is:
(1) securing connections and communications
(2) authenticating users (logins)
(3) encrypting files
4.1 Materials
To elicit visual metaphors from developers, we need to ensure they
conceive of the functionality as objectively as possible. Thus, we
need to avoid the abstract terminology such as ‘authenticating’ and
‘encrypting’, instead opting for clear descriptions of what is done
in such functionality, free from jargon as much as possible. Some
non-exhaustive examples follow below.
This may, for example, be done by describing abstract ‘objects’
of functionality, e.g., something that secures connections and
communications as performing a sequence of actions:
• it makes sure you know exactly who the sender of the mes-
sage is (optional)
• it makes sure you know exactly who is the recipient of the
message
• it makes sure you know exactly what is/are the message(s)
to be sent
• it makes sure nobody but the sender and recipient can read
the message
Something that allows authentication of user(s) login(s)
may be described as performing this sequence of actions:
• there are users with some identification
• those users have some password
• it only allows access to those users that know their passwords
Something that encrypts files may be described as perform-
ing this sequence of actions:
• it makes sure its contents are hidden
• it makes sure it is stored safely and locally
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Visual metaphor generation. Having a way to describe the
core functionality free of jargon (and thus likely to avoid misinter-
pretation based on limited or wrong technical understanding), we
need to generate visual metaphors. Participants should therefore
not be constrained to text only. A study employing, e.g., partici-
patory design of metaphors, would include for each of the three
core functionalities a key question: How do you conceive of an object
that does the following?, followed by a listing of functionality per
the above. Participants would then be stimulated to co-design the
metaphors, drawing any visual things that come to mind. Moreover,
participants would be stimulated to verbalize their thoughts (in line
with the think-aloud protocol), to allow for coding and analysis of
their design thinking.
4.2.2 Coding of data. To analyze recorded verbal responses dur-
ing the design session(s), data will be transcribed and subsequently
coded in several iterations by multiple independent coders. First,
each coder will perform two to three iterations grouping responses
together. The resulting groupings between coders will be compared
and used to derive codes that the textual answers may then be
classified by.
To analyze the elicited visual responses, data will be coded in a
similar way, with multiple independent coders grouping produced
visual answers. The grouping of these visual answers will then be
compared to the result of the textual response analysis, in order to
provide a mapping between potentially matching textual and visual
descriptions. This mapping can then be used to aid in the generation
of final visual metaphors by taking the most re-occurring visual
variables (e.g., shape, color, texture), as well as higher level visual
information like coded symbolism.
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4.3 Participants
A set of focused participatory design sessions generating visual
metaphors is a first step in building targeted metaphors. Such ses-
sions can involve carefully selected participants from different back-
grounds with interests in coding.
Acknowledging the wide spectrum of of developers in the com-
munity described in Section 2, with distinct personal and profes-
sional make-up, performing the above again as a wider crowd-
sourced study would be appropriate to ensure information satura-
tion – quite in line with elicitation of requirements via the crowd [7].
This could also shift the used method to e.g., carefully designed
interactive surveys, so as to target a wider audience. We would first
target specifically developers releasing software for the Android
ecosystem, so as to delineate the community more effectively.
This community, however, should not be a priori considered to be
homogeneous in their habits or attitudes, quite far from it. Through
the coding of responses likely several clusters will arise of distinct
conceptualization patterns which may, together with elicited demo-
graphic data, lead to the identification of smaller sub communities
that conceptualize and work in particular ways. This can be used to
produce essentially visual dialects of proposed metaphors, in order
to offer personalized support for different groups.
5 CONCLUDING OUTLOOK
This vision paper sets out our vision towards secure cryptography
API use by young and inexperienced developers, by moving them
away from the actual source-code. Instead, we propose to follow
the visual programming language paradigm, and use targeted em-
pirically grounded visual metaphors to offer building blocks for the
most needed cryptography functionality.
Our future work is set to implement the study described here,
connecting eventually-produced personalized visual blocks with
automatically generated code that uses key functionality, using e.g.,
CogniCrypt’s existing generation of source-code correctly using
cryptography APIs.
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